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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KALLIE J. SILL, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
JOEL GORDON SILL, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the trial court's final order dismissing respondent-appellant 
Joel Sill's petition to modify the divorce decree. (Ruling and Order - hereafter 
"Order" - attached as Addendum). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. 
Sill's petition to modify the divorce decree (with respect to the amount of alimony it 
requires him to pay) based on the court's conclusion that even a substantial-change-in-
circumstances modification was prohibited by the parties' stipulation, contained in the 
agreement upon which the decree was based, that the decree could not be modified 
except in a narrow circumstance not alleged in the petition. 
* Case No. 20060296-CA 
Mr. Sill preserved that issue for review in his memorandum opposing Ms. Sill's 
motion to dismiss his petition to modify. (R. 127-32). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. As the trial court noted (Order 1-3), the 
parties' decree of divorce was based on their signed written agreement. In that 
agreement, Ms. Sill accepted an alimony award of $6,000 per month based on a global 
settlement involving, among other things, division of approximately $1.8 million in 
property. Paragraph 20 of the agreement states: "The provisions of this agreement 
shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of Divorce which implements it with the 
sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this 
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate disposition." 
Against that backdrop, Mr. Sill sought modification of the alimony award based 
on a substantial change of circumstances. The trial court dismissed his petition for 
modification on the ground that the non-modification provision in the parties' 
agreement precluded modification of the decree, including the award of alimony. 
Order 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005), a trial court retains 
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of a 
divorce. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, and this Court has recognized, that 
statutory authority to modify an alimony award is not trumped by the parties' 
agreement concerning alimony, even where there is a stipulation to an unalterable 
amount of alimony. In light of that supreme court precedent, the trial court erroneously 
dismissed Mr. Sill's petition to modify alimony based solely on the parties' agreement 
concerning alimony and other matters related to the divorce, and the non-modification 
provision contained in that agreement. That the agreement contains such a provision 
does not, as the supreme court has made clear, prevent consideration of a petition to 
modify alimony by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Mr, Sill's petition to modify based on its 
conclusion that the parties' stipulation concerning no modification of the divorce 
decree prohibited the court from considering Mr. Sill's request to modify the 
alimony award based on an alleged substantial material change in circumstances. 
A. Introduction 
In dismissing Mr. Sill's petition to modify the alimony award in the parties' 
divorce decree, the trial court concluded that the agreement between the parties, upon 
which the divorce decree was based, precluded consideration of the petition. 
Specifically, the court determined that paragraph 20 of that agreement (the non-
modification provision) prohibited a modification of alimony, because it reflected "a 
clear intent of the parties to live with what they [had] agreed to" and constituted "a 
knowing and specific waiver * * * of the right to modify alimony, as well as other 
pro visions [.]" Order 3-4. The narrow question in this case is whether the court 
correctly concluded that, in light of paragraph 20, it could not consider Mr. Sill's 
request for a modification of alimony, even though under Utah law a trial court "has 
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of 
the divorce." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005). 
B. Standard of Review 
Because the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition ultimately involved 
interpretation of section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), this Court reviews its decision for correctness. 
Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, 1 4, 98 P.3d 1178, cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 
(Utah 2005). 
C. The trial court's ruling is contrary to Utah Supreme Court precedent and 
therefore should be reversed. 
The issue on appeal is straightforward: Did the trial court err in concluding that 
the parties' agreement, which contains a non-modification provision, trumps the court's 
statutory authority to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of 
the divorce? The simple answer is that the court clearly erred, because the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that with respect to an alimony award, a court retains the 
power to modify the award when a change in circumstances justifies it, in spite of the 
parties' efforts to control the matter by contract. 
In Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), the supreme court rejected the 
argument that the trial court lacked the power to modify an alimony award in light of 
the parties' stipulated settlement on the matter. Citing section 30-3-5(1), the court said 
that "[t]he language of the statute makes it clear that the appellant's position that the 
trial court lacked power or jurisdiction to modify an alimony award is without merit." 
700 P.2d at 709. It noted that it had "rejected a similar argument respecting a 
stipulated settlement requiring periodic payments in Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 
261 P.2d 944 (1953)." Id. The court then quoted the controlling language from 
Callister: 
"We further hold that these [monthly payment] provisions are not an 
inseparable part of the agreement relating to division of property and by 
approval of the agreement in the decree the court did not divest itself of 
jurisdiction under the statute to make such subsequent changes and orders 
with respect to alimony payments as might be reasonable and proper, 
based upon change of circumstances. We hold this to be true even though 
the provisions of the agreement should be interpreted to mean that the 
parties intended to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable amount of 
alimony. The object and purpose of the statute is to give the courts power 
to enforce, after divorce, the duty of support which exists between a 
husband and wife or parent and child. Legislators who enacted the law 
were probably aware of the fact, which is a matter of common knowledge 
to trial courts, that parties to divorce suits frequently enter into 
agreements relative to alimony or for child support which, if binding upon 
the courts, would leave children or divorced wives inadequately provided 
for. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was intended to give 
the courts power to disregard the stipulations or agreement of the parties 
in the first instance and enter judgment for such alimony or child support 
as appears reasonable, and to thereafter modify such judgments when 
change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of attempts of the parties to 
control the matter by contract. 
700 P.2d at 709-10 (quoting Callister, 1 Utah 2d at 41, 261 P.2d at 948-49, brackets 
and emphasis added by Naylor court). 
The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition to modify the alimony award 
based solely on the parties' agreement is directly contrary to Naylor and Callister. This 
Court recently applied those decisions in reversing a trial court's denial of a father's 
petition to modify a child-support obligation based solely on the father's earlier 
stipulation concerning that obligation. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, t 5 (citing Naylor 
and Callister). The analysis employed in Diener applies with equal force in the instant 
case. The error the trial court committed here is indistinguishable from the error the 
trial court committed in Diener. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition to modify. Under Naylor, Callister, and Diener, 
the trial court must consider Mr. Sill's contention that a modification of the alimony 
award is justified based on a substantial change of circumstances, notwithstanding the 
parties' pre-divorce agreement to an unalterable amount for alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
order dismissing Mr. Sill's petition to modify and remand the case for consideration of 
the merits of that petition. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because clear Utah Supreme Court precedent controls this case, oral argument is 
unnecessary. 
Dated this fCv day of August 2006. 
CHRISTINA I. MILLER 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
Joel Gordon Sill 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August 9, 2006,1 served the foregoing Brief of Appellant on the 
attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee by mailing two copies, with postage prepaid, in an 
envelope addressed to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Dena C. Sarandos 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
CHRISTINA I. MILLER 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KALLIE J. SILL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOEL GORDON SILL, 
Respondent. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 004600060 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: February 22, 2006 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Petitioner's Motion to dismiss respondent's petition to modify. 
In this case a decree was entered March 7, 2001. Respondent 
filed a petition to modify the decree September 13, 2005. 
Petitioner moved to dismiss that petition on September 26, 2005. 
Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss on October 12, 2005, and 
petitioner replied October 20, 2005. The court scheduled oral 
argument for January 23, 2006. In the meantime petitioner filed a 
motion to have respondent held in contempt. At oral argument, 
for the first time as neither party briefed the issue, it was 
pointed out that there was a provision in the decree that it was 
non-modifiable. 
Accordingly, the court asked the parties to brief the issue 
concerning the effect of that provision on the pending motions. 
Respondent filed her memo February 2, 2006, and petitioner 
filed a response February 10, 2006. Respondent filed a reply and 
Notice to Submit on February 21, 2006. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and concludes as follows. 
ARGUMENTS 
Respondent argues that even if there is a stipulation, the 
court can always modify alimony under UCA 30-3-5(8) (g) , wherein 
the court is given continuing jurisdiction to make new orders 
concerning alimony. Respondent argues the court has the ability 
to go beyond an agreement and order what alimony is reasonable. 
Petitioner urges that the decree was based on arms-length 
negotiations, wherein petitioner agreed to accept ten years, 
alimony at $6000 per month (the parties were married 18 years) 
based on a global settlement involving a substantial property 
settlement of approximately $1.8 million. 
If there was a meeting of the minds, the contract should be 
binding. If there is a clear and unmistakable waiver of some 
right, that will be upheld and equity should not and does not 
reinstate rights voluntarily bargained away by agreement. Both 
parties had counsel and each party benefitted in the decree and 
both suffered some detriment. 
DISCUSSION 
This case presents a difficult question to the court. There 
-2-
is language in cases cited by each party that supports their 
positions. Thus, to the court, the issue is really one of the 
intent of the parties, whether that intent is expressed clearly 
and unmistakably in the decree. The decree was based on a signed 
written agreement of the parties, each with competent and present 
counsel. Paragraph 20 of the agreement states "The provisions of 
this agreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of 
Divorce which implements it with the sole exception that if all 
of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this 
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for 
appropriate disposition." To the court, that is a knowing and 
specific waiver, not a waiver of alimony, but a waiver of the 
right to modify alimony, as well as other provisions, with an 
exception not alleged or present in this case. 
This is not a waiver of alimony case where there are changed 
circumstances. Substantial assets were present and there was 
obviously give and take in the process of the settlement. This is 
not a case where the parties were or are acting pro se or where 
it appears one party was taken advantage of so that equitable 
powers ought to intervene and "repair" an unfair agreement. From 
all that appears there was adequate consideration and the 
agreement is not on its face unconscionable nor even unfair. No 
public policy seems to be violated in this agreement that 
resulted in the decree. 
-3-
This agreement was between two competent and accomplished 
persons with two competent and accomplished counsel. There is no 
suggestion of coercion involved in this instance nor fundamental 
unfairness. Even though there is now alleged a change of 
circumstances, to allow the settlement now to be changed by 
either party would, as the courts of this state have noted, 
encourage fraud and discourage settlements. Settlements would 
never be final and so settlements would not occur and more 
litigation would result rather than having cases settle. 
The court believes the non-modification provision is clear 
and encompasses not only alimony but all provisions of the 
decree. While it did not specify alimony, it was the last 
paragraph of the agreement and the decree, indicating to Lhe 
court a clear intent of the parties to live with what they agreed 
to. 
The motion to dismiss the petition to modify is GRANTED. To 
the extent petitioner now also seeks a change of the decree in 
her January 17, 2006, filing, that relief is not appropriate 
under this reasoning. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
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order is required. 
DATED this ^ day ofM , 2006. 
BY TH-E;;,,e-0UR5> 
/ ' / 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-5-
